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The debt crisis that affects middle-income  developing countries
gets more publicity than the one that affects low-income African
countries - but the debt service in 10 of those countries aver-
ages 80 percent of annual exports. Poverty and economic rigidi-
ties make it hard for them to grow out of their debt problems
without increased concessional aid and debt rescheduling.
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dPlc,Planning,  and Research
Debt  and  Internadlonal  FinanceI
Two debt crises affect developing countries.  grow out of their debt problems without special
The more publicized crisis affects the middle-  assistance. These countries are more dependent
income Baker Plan countries, including Nigeria  than the highly indebted countries on primary
and Cote d'lvoire.  The less well known crisis  commodity exports, which often require long
affects most of Africa's 34 low-income coun-  investment periods to increase production.
tries.  Expanding the output of tradable goods, which
is central to adjustment, is difficult and likely to
The total external debt of these countries-  be slow.
about $70 billion - is less than the debt of
Mexico alone.  Intemational bank exposure there  Recognizing the problems of these coun-
is less than $10 billion.  Low-income Africa's  tries, several bilateral donors have converted
external liabilities are mainly loans from, or  concessional development loans to grants in
guaranteed by, official creditors. Their debt  many of these countries. Donor govemrn nts
represents no threat to the intemational financial  have endorsed concessional debt relief.  l1  tie
system, so it generates little publicity.  near-term relief from rescheduling will not be
great, but the principal of orderly debt reduction
But their extemal debt represents, by many  has been put into practice.
measures, a more severe economic burden than
the debt of the middle-income countries. Ten of  Debtor countries must take the lead in
the most severely indebted African countries  establishing and maintaining workable medium-
owe an average of over 1,000 percent of their  term adjustment programs.  Once adjustment is
annual exports.  occurring, it is in the interests of donors and
creditors to continue supporting recovery well
Poverty and economic rigidities in the  into the 1990s.
African countries make it harder for them to
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Appendix Tables  42Two  debt crises affect developing cottntries. The more highly
publicized  crisis  affects  the  middle-income  "Baker  Plan"  countries,  including
Nigeria  and  Cote d'Ivoire  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. The  other,  less  well  known,
debt  crisis  affects the  majority of  a  set  of  34  low-income  African
countries.  (See  Annex table  2 on page 42 for a list of low-income  African
countries.)  The total  external  debt  of these  countries,  about  $70  billion,  is
less than Mexico's  alone (see  Annex  table 1, page 41.)  International  bank
exposure there is less than $10 billion.  Low-income  Africa's external
liabilities  are  mainly  loans  from,  or guaranteed  by,  official  creditors.
Because their debt  represents no  threat to  the  international
financial  system,  these countries  receive  very little  publicity  about  their
plight. Yet, their  external  debt  represents,  by many  measures,  a  move severe
burden  to their economies  than the middle-income  country  debt represents  to
those economies.  Ten  of the most severely indebted low-income  African
countries owe, on  average, over 1000 percent of  their annual exports.
Scheduled  debt service  for these  ten countries  averages  80 percent  of annual
exports. The latter  ratio--which  unlike  the  debt to export  ratio--takes  into
account  the  more  concessional  terms  of low-income  Africa's  debt,  is  40 percent
higher than the comparable  ratio for  the highly indebted  middle income
countries  (HICs).
In addition,  the  poverty  and  economic  rigidities  in  these  countries
make it harder for them to  grow out of their  debt problems  without special
assistance. Low-income  African  countries  are  more  dependent  than  the  HICs  on
primary commodity  exports,  that often require long investment  periods toincrease  production. They live in more difficult  conditions  in terms  of the
availability  of health care and of access to safe drinking  water.  Their
education  systems  completely  miss  over a third  of school  age  children. Under
these  conditions  the  expansion  of the  output  of tradable  goods  that  is  central
to  adjustment  is  difficult  and  is likely  to be slow.
Official  creditors  and dnnors  have recognized  the severe  and long-
term  nature  of the debt and development  problems  facing  highly  indebted  low-
income countries.  Since  1978, several bilateral donors have converted
concessional  development  loans to grants in many of these countries.  The
World Bank's Special Program of Assistance  (SPA) and the Fund's Enhanced
Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF),  both backed  by bilateral  donors,  were
launched  in 1987  to address  these  problems  more directly. Most recently,  at
the 1988 Toronto  Summit,  donor  governments  endorsed  concessional  debt relief
for  low-income  debt-distressed  countries. Industrial-country  governments  have
worked  out the  forms  of that  relief  and  have rescheduled  debts  of the  Central
African Republic, Guinea, Niger, Madagascar,  Mali, Senegal,  Tanzania,  and
Uganda under  the  new  arrangements.  The  near-term relief from  these
reschedulings  will not be large,  but the important  principal  of orderly  debt
reduction  has  now  been  put  into  practice. Together,  these  actions  by  official
creditors  and donors  are important  steps  in restoring  normal  creditor-debtor
relationships  in these  countries. In some countries,  more  will be required,
in terms of larger  asjistance  or the maintainance  of a high level special
assistance  for some  time  beyond  the scheduled  expiration  of the  SPA  and  other
special  programs.
Although  they are not a major share  of total  claims  on low-income
African  countries,  commercial  bank  claims  remain  a significant  problem  in some
of the  most debt-distressed  low-income  African  countries. The  additional  aid-3-
and  debt  reduction provided by  official creditors may  tend to  benefit
commercial  banks  disproportionately.  Some  method  of burden  sharing  would  help
to ensure  that these  official  resources  support  growth. One  method  would  be
the use of concessional  aid to buy up long-term  commercial  bank claims,  at
heavily  discounted  prices,  and pass the discount  on to the debtor  country.
This process would be  similar  to the Bolivian  buy-back,  but if possible
without  the price increases  that resulted  from the Bolivian  buyback.  Other
methods include  increased  official  tax and regulatory  support  for commercial
bank  donations of  claims  to  aid  or  charitable organizations.  The
organizations  would  use the  local  currency  payments  to support  their  programs
in the  debtor  country.
To grow out  of debt difficulties,  even with the extraordinary
external support forthcoming,  debtor countries must  take  the  lead  in
establishing  and  maintaining  workable  medium-term  adjustment  programs. It is
in the  interest  of donors  and  creditors  to  provide  adequate  external  resources
to  support these  programs, once  orderly and  sustained adjustment is
occurring.  The external  support  now in place  covers  mainly  the years 1988-
90.  With its economic rigidities,  low investment  and savings  rates, and
infrasturctural  weaknesses,  recovery  in low-income  Africa  will extend well
into  the  next  decade. Donors  must  keep  in  mind  the  special  extirnal  financing
needs  of these  countries  after  1990,  especially  during  discussions  surrounding
the  upcoming  Ninth  Replenishment  of the  International  Development  Association,
the  soft-loan  window  of the  World  Bank.
Why  Low-Income  Africa's  Debt  Problem  is  Different
Origins  of the  Debt  Problem-4-
The origins  of low-income  Sub-Saharan  Africa's  debt problem  are in
many respects  similar  to those in other highly  indebted  countries.  World
commodity  prices, in rzal terms,  for many of their  major  commodity  exports
(including bauxite, cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, tea,  groundnuts,  and
uranium)  peaked  in the  mid- or late  1970s. These  commodity  booms  lowered  the
real  cost  of borrowing  (it  was  negative  in  the  last  half  of the  1970s)  and led
to optimistic  expectations  that  future  export  revenues  would  rise  in  line  with
the  growth  in  external  obligations.
This optimism  fueled two converging  tendencies.  Stt;-ig  commodity
prices increased  government  revenues  and allowed  governments  to ratchet  up
expenditures,  which were difficult  to compress  when commodity  prices fell
(Krumm  1985). But  these  low-income  countries  appeared  creditworthy  at a time
when export  credit  agencies  were under pressure  to promote  exports  to help
offset  the rising  cost of oil imports.  As a result,  there  were short,  but
intense,  bursts  of ECA-financed  (or  guaranteed)  exports  to low-income  Africa,
for  intermediate  and  capital  goods. Direct  end  guaranteed  export  credits  grew
rapidly  during  the  1970s  (see  table  1).  In  addition,  a few  low-income  African
countries  had some  access  to the  international  syndicated  loans  of commercial
banks.
Even countries  that did  not go through  major  commodity  export  price
booms (for instance  copper exporters  like Zaire and Zambia and iron ore
exporters  Like Liberia  and Mauritania)  could borrow  more because  of their
previous growth, their mineral reserves, and  the expectation  that these
mineral  prices  would  eventually  rise  along  with  those  of other  commodities.-5-
TABLE  1:  Borrowing  by  Low-Income  Africa,  1970-87
(billions  of U.S.  dollars;  numbers  in parentheses  are  percentages)
1970  1980  1987
Total  nonconcessional  debt  2.0  18.2  37.5
(Share  of total  long-term  debt)  (48)  (65)  (63)
ECA-type  debt  1.0  10.1  19.0
(Share  of total  long-term  debt)  (25)  (36)  (32)
Debt  service  payments  on ECA-type  debt  0.1  0.9  0.9
(Share  of payments  on total  long-term  debt)  (42)  (41)  (34)
Source: World  Bank  Debtor  Reporting  System.
Note:  Excludes  short-term  debt.  ECA-type  debt  is  defined  as direct  bilateral
official  nonconcessional  lending  plus  all  private-source  suppliers  credits  and
fixed-rate  commercial  bank loans, which are assumed to be guaranteed  by
creditor  governments  or agencies.
Many African  economies  fell  out of step  with the world  economy  when
too  optimistic images of  the  future faded and  unrealistic development
strategies  failed.  Export prices declined sharply,  growth in industrial
countries  slumped,  governments  were slow to react,  and the economies  were
unable to adjust.  The conditions  of these nonconcessional  export  credits
turned  out to be unrealistically  hard, in terms  of both interest  rates  and
repayment  periods.
The windfall  resources  from the boom years of the late 1970s  and
early  1980s  did  not accelerate  development. Instead,  they led  to unrealistic
expectations,  overextended  borrowing  on commercial  terms,  and  an unmanageable
debt  burden.
The Contrast  Between  Low-Income  Africa  and the Highly  Indebted  Middle-Income
Countries
There  are  differences  with  the  highly  indebted middle  income
countries.  (See  table  2 for  a list  of the latter  countries.) Increases  in- 6 -
real interest  rates were less of a factor in low-income  Africa, tha debt
crisis came earlier, and, most importantly,  the debt burden is, by most
measures,  more severe.
Although  the  unexpected  increases  in real interest  rates  were a key
element  in the  highly  indebted  middle-income  countrys'  debt  crisis  (Cuddington
1989),  they  played  a much  smaller  part  in  low-income  African  countries  because
much less of their bilateral  official  and private  debt is denominated  in
variable  rates (5 percent compared  to 66 percent for the highly indebted
middle  income  countries  in 1987).
The debt problem  emerged  earlier in low-income  Africa  than in the
highly indebted  middle income  countries.  Beginning  with Zaire in 1976, 10
low-income  African  countries  rescheduled  official  claims  or 19 occasions  and
commercial  bank claims  on five occasions  before  the first  reschedulinp  by a
highly indebted  middle-income  country in 1.32.  Though  the origins  may be
similar,  the  debt  problem  in low-income  Africa  is  more severe  and  less  easy  to
correct  without  special  help.
Low-income  Africa  is  more  heavily  indebted. Although  the  amounts  are
small  relative  to financial  stocks  and flows  in other  developing  countries,
the debt is worse for many low-income  countries.  The usual ratios  are as
severe,  and the economies  of these countries  are less able to absorb the
required  adjustments  (see  table  2).-7-
Table  2:  Indicators  of Debt  Burdens,  1987
(billions  of U.S.  dollars;  numbers  in  parentheses  are  percentages)
Highly
Indebted Low-  Low-
Mid.-Inc.  income  income
Cos.*  Africa  Asia**
Total  debt  527  71  113
(official)  (28)  (77)  (68)
Debt  service  payments  56.4  4.2  11.8
(official)  (33)  (68)  (56)
Ratio  of debt  to  exports  (357)  (520)  (158)
Ratio  of debt  to  GNP  (63)  (104)  (19)
Debt  service  ratio  (38  (31)  (17)
(payments  basis)
Debt  service  ratio  (59)  (52)  (17)
(obligation  basis,
using  1987  exports)
Source: World  Bank  Debtor  Reporting  System.
Notes:  Total debt includes  IMF and short-term  obligations. Debt-service
payments  iucLude  IMP  repurchases  and charges  and estimated  interest  on short-
term  debt.
*1  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa Rica,  Cote d'Ivoire,
Equador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru,  Philippines,  Uruguay,
Venezuela,  and  Yugoslavia.
**/  Bangladesh,  Bhutan, Burma, China, India, Lao PDR, Maldives,  Nepal,
Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Vanuatu.
Most  methods  of assessing  debt  burdens  show  low-income  Africa  faces  a
more  difficult  debt  situation  than  the  highly  indebted  middle  income  countries
and than other low-income  countries  in other developing  regions.  The most
severely  indebted  low-income  Africa  countries  owe  debt  amounting  to  almost  100
percent  of their GNP and 500 percent  of their annual  exports.  These debt
ratios  are  nearly  double  those  in the  highly  indebted  middle  income  countries.
The comparison  with low-income  Asian  countries,  where  the  external  a  bt ratio
averages  less than a third  of the ratio  in the severely  indebted  low-income
African  courtries,  is  more telling.- 8  -
Because  more  of this  debt  is concessional  (almost  half  of total  debt
in low-income  Africa compared  to 5 percent in the highly indebted  middle
income  countries),  the usual ratios  may overstate  low-income  Africa's  real
debt  burden.!1 The most straightforward  adjustment  for  concessionality  is to
reduce  the  debt stock  by its  grant  equivalent,  which  can  be estimated  as the
difference  between  the nominal  value  and the discounted  present  value  of all
scheduled debt  service on  all  outstanding  debt.  The  estimated grant
equivalent  in  low-income  Africa's  existing  debt is  about  $17  billion. On this
basis,  its ratios  of debt to GNP  and to annual  exports  drop to about  80 and
400  percent,  respectively. Even adjusting  for this higher  concessionality,
low-income  Africa's  burden (debt  as percentage  of experts  and GNP) remains
more severe  than the  highly  indebted  middle  income  countries.  In addition,
the  bite  that  debt-service  payments  takes  out  of  exports  is  about  as large.
But  one  element  that  mitigates  low  income  Africa's  debt  burden  is the
high  level  of  grants  in its  capital  inflows. Grants  make  up  more  than  half  of
the total gross capital inflows  of  IDA-eligible  countries  in Sub-Saharan
Africa,  compared  with less than a fifth for the rest of the region  (World
Bank,  1989).  In  1987,  grants were  $6.4  billion, including technical
assistance  grants  that are 35 to 40 percent  of the total.  If these  grants
were  included  in  export  receipts  in that  year,  the  adjusted  debt  service  ratio
would have been much lower than the conventional  debt service  ratio (21
percent  compared  to  31 percent).
1/  Debt  is conveniently  defined  as  concessional  when its  terms  are  long  enough
and its  interest  rates  low  enough  that  it  contains  an implicit  grant  element
of at least  25 percent,  using  a discount  rate  of 10  percent. (See  OECD 1987,
Annex.) Because  of the  convention  of using  a 10  percent  discounc  rate,  debt
on regular  commercial  terms  may  appear  to  have  a  grant  element. This  anomaly
can  be eliminated  by using  the  current  commercial  interest  rate  as the
discount  factor.-9-
No matter  how it is measured,  the strong  conclusion  from  these  data
is that low-income  Sub-Saharan  1irica  is more severely  indebted. The short-
term real cost of this  higt.r  indebtedness  (debt  service  paid) is almost  as
severe for  low-income  Africa as  for  the highly indebted middle income
countries  when  compared  to export  receipts. But  the  region's  capacity  to  bear
this  more severe  burden  is limited  by its  weaker,  more rigid,  economies.
Economic  Factors  Behind  Low-Income  Africa's  Debt  Difficulties
Although  the origins  and characteristics  of their  debt problems  are
similar,  the  weaker,  less flexible  economies  in low-income  Africa  limits  more
severely  their  ability  to adjust  sufficiently  and rapidly  enough  to restore
creditworthiness. Structural  economic  rigidities  have been compounded  by
policy  rigidities. These  economies  have  an arguably  lower  capacity  to  adjust
to their debt burdens.  As a result, a strategy  of simply  delaying  debt
service  payments  to allow  these  countries  to grow out  of their  debt  problems
is  much  less  like'.y  to  work.
Structural  weaknesses.  Structural  weaknesses  preclude  most  of these  economies
from achieving the  rapid  growth necessary to  escape  from  their debt
difficulties  under conventional  debt relief  mechanisms. They are smaller,
poorer,  and more dependent  on primary  commodities  than the Highly  indebted
middle  income  countries. The lack of a diversified  economy  and export  base
makes  it  more  difficult  to  adjust  to  changing  world  economic  conditions.
Population  growth  is higher  by almost  a percentage  point  compared  to
the Highly  indebtei  middle  income  countries  (see table 3),  making  it harder
both to increase  per capita income  and to provide  for basic human needs.
Living conditions and the  quality of  human capital are worse.  Infant- 10  -
mortality  is about  double than in Highly  indebted  middle income  countries.
Life expectanicy  is some ten years less than in the Highly  indebted  middle
income  countries. Only about two-thirds  of the school-aged  children  attend
primary  school  compared  with almost  100  percent  in the  Highly  indebted  middle
income  countries;  and only 16 percent  attend  high schoot  compared  with about
half in the  Highly  indebted  middle  income  countries. Relative  to  population,
there are seven  times  more physicians  in the Highly  indebted  middle income
countries.
Savings and investment  rates are, on average,  the lowest in the
developing  world, making it harder co strengthen  their productive  base;
savings  rates are only a third those in the Highly indebted  middle income
countries  and investment  rates, for all low-income  Africa, are some five
percentage  points lower (see table 3).  Low-incomes  make it difficult to
increase  investment  and savings.  They are almost twice as dependent on
imports  as the Highly indebted  middle income countries,  but their export
shares  are not much larger.  Consequently,  low-income  Africa  countries  have
substantial  resource  gaps,  and foreign  capital  is essential  both to finance
trade  deficits  and  domestic  investment. Gross  aid flows,  including  technical
assistance  and other  grants,  are about US$10 billion  a year,  equivalent  to
about 90 percent  of gross domestic  investment  in these countries,  and are
three  times  their  actual  debt  service  payments  on  nonconcessional  debt.
Investments  that are  made are less  productive. Incremental  capital
output  ratios  (ICOR)  measure  the  units  of investment  required  to raise  annual
output  by one unit;  smaller  ratios  imply  greater  efficiency  and productivity
than higher  ratios.  Those in low-income  Africa  are much higher  than in the
Highly  indebted  middTe  income  countries. During  the 1970s,  the  best ICORs  in
low-income  Africa (about  five,  with most being much higher)  were about the- 11  -
same as the worst ICORs in the Highly indebted  middle income countries (most
were about three).
Table 3:  Indications  of Structural Differences Between Low-Income Africa and
Highly Indebted Middle Income Countries
Low-income  HICs
Africa
Average population per country  9  36
(millions, 1987)
Population growth (annual  3.1  2.4
percentage, 1987)
GNP per capita (ATLAS  basis)  287  1452
(US$, 1987)
Gross domestic savings  6  14
(percent  of GDP in current
prices, 1986-87)
Gross domestic investment  14  20
(percent of CDP in current
prices, 1986-87)
Exports as share of GDP  19  16
(percent, 1980-86)  /a
Imports  as share of GDP  28  15
(percent, 1980-86)/a
Share of manufacturing  8  26
in exports (1986-87,  percent)
Source:  World Bank data files.
Notes:  Averages are weighted
/a Goods and nonfactor services
Their economic performance has been poor, both before and during the
debt crisis.  GDP grew in low-income Africa by only 2 percent a year in 1970-
80, declining in per capita terms.  Over the same period, GDP grew by almost 6
percent a  year in the highly  indebted middle  income countries.  Since the
onset  of  the  international  debt  crisis  in  1982,  when  new  flows  of- 12 -
nonconcessional  capital  virtually  dried  up for these  countries,  their  export
growth  has  been  lower  and  more  erratic  than  that  of the  Highly  indebted  middle
income  countries  and their per capita  consumption  has been declining  faster
(see table  4).  Low-incom'e  Africa's  export  volume  is lower  now than in 1970,
and the failure of exports to expand in line with expanding  world trade
(including  that in primary  commodities)  goes far in explaining  the region's
debt servicing  difficulties. If these  countries  had simply  maintained  export
growth  in line with other  developing  countries,  their  debt service  ratio in
1987 would have been more than a third lower.  Had they simply  maintained
their  market  shares  in developing  countries'  nonoil  primary  commodities,  the
additional  export  revenue  would  have  amounted  to about  twice  as much  as their
debt  service  payments  in  the  mid-1980s.
The  failure  to  diversify  their  exports  out  of primary  commodities  has
also  contributed to  their  problems coping with  higher  debt  burdens.
Manufactured  exports  represent  the  most rapidly  growing  segment  of developing
country  exports,  and have had by far the  highest  growth  rate of exports  from
the  Highly  indebted  middle  income  countriea  during  the 1980s.  But  the  Highly
indebted  middle income  countries  also increased  substantially  the volume  of
nonoil  primary  exports  as well, in contrast  to the  decline  in these  in low-
income  Africa.- 13  -
Table  4:  Selected  Economic  Indicators
Low-income  HICs
Africa
GDP  growth  (1982-87,  annual  1.8  2.0
percentage)
Export  growth  (1982-87,  annual  0.6  4.3
percentage)
Instability  of export  revenues
(1970-85,  median  country  values)  20.8  20.2
Import  growth  (1982-87,  annual  -1.1  -3.0
percentage)
Per  capita  consumption  growth  -1.7  -0.4
(1982-87,  annual  percentage)
Sources: World  Bank  data  files  and  Development  Committee  Pamphlet  No. 15
Notes: Growth  rates  are  weighted  and  computed  in constant  prices  using  least
squares  regression.
Poor  policies have  compounded these  structural rigidities and
contributed  to poor performance. As in the highly indebted  middle income
countries,  these  must also be rectified  if the  region  is to recover  from the
debt  crisis.  These  have been  dealt  with  at length  elsewhere,  including  recent
progress  on reforms. However,  regardless  of the  reforms  adopted,  developing  a
solution  to their  debt  problem  depends  on the  structure  of their  debt.
The  Structure  of  Low-Income  Africa's  Debt  is  Different
Almost  90  percent  of low-income  Africa's  total  debt  represents  claims
directly from or  guaranteed by  official agencies, both  bilateral and
multilateral. (See  appendix  tables  1 and 2  for  a creditor  breakdown  of low-
income  Africa's  debt.)  Thus, the bulk o  the creditor  effort  to help deal- 14  -
with  the  problem in these countries must be by  official agencies, not
commercial  banks.  ln the shortrun,  efforts  of official  creditors  must focus
on reducing  debt service  obligations  and payments  in an orderly  fashion,  and
on increasing  gross  capital  inflows.
Well over half (60 percent)  of the official  claims  are bilateral,
including  private  loans  guaranteed  by official  export  credit  agencies. Most
low-income  African countries  could not  borrow to any  significant  degree
without  external  guarantees  provided  by official  export  credit  agencies.  When
borrowers  were unable  to pay  debt service  due on these  loans,  the ECAs have
picked  up these  claims. Altogether,  private  lending  by commercial  banks  and
suppliers  to low-income  African  councries  accounts  for  about  eight  percent  of
their  total  debt, or a quarter  of their  nonconcessional,  bilateral  official
debt.2/
About half (52 percent)  of this bilateral  official  and officially
guaranteed  debt  is  nonconcessional.  Although  official  bilateral
nonconcessional  direct  and  guaranteed  loans  (mainly  ECA  exposure)  represented
almost  30 percent  of the long-term  debt in these  countries,  it accounted  for
27  percent of  debt  service payments on  long-term debt  (including IMF
transactions)  in 1987  and 53 percent  of scheduled  debt service  obligations  in
1988.
Multilateral  creditors,  including  the  IMF,  hold  about  $25  billion  (39
percent)  of the claims  on low-income  Africa.  More than 60 percent  of these
claims  are at concessional  interest  rates  and  represent  a small  proportion  of
scheduled  debt  service  obligations.
2/  This  figure  includes  only  guaraateed  debt  for  which  the  guarantee  has  not
been  called. It  has%been  estimated  from  the  loans  recorded  in the  Debtor
Reporting  System  on the  assumption  that  all suppliers  credits  are  guaranteed
and  all  commercial  bank  loans  issued  with fixed  interest  are  guaranteed.- 1C  -
Table 5:  Low-Income Africa's Multilateral Debt
US$ billion  percent
of total
long-term
Multilateral debt, 1987  25.5  39
of which:
World Bank  3.0  5
IDA  9.6  15
IMF  5.6  9
AfDB/F  2.8  4
Debt service payments  2.0  54
on multilateral debt, 1987
of which:
World Bank  0.4  10
IDA  0.1  3
IMF  1.0  27
AfDB/F  0.2  5
IDA, the soft loan window of the World Bank, holds almost $10 billion
in claims  on  the  34 countries  (excluding Mozambique) and  is their largest
single creditor.  Although IDA credits account for 15 percent of their total
long-term debt, debt  service to IDA amounted to less than three percent of
their actual long-term debt-service payments in 1987.
Private commercial lending to low-income Africa, mostly by commercial
banks,  that  is  not  guaranteed  by  creditor  governments  or  agencies  is
relatively small--less than $10 billion (13 percent) of total external debt.
Most  of  this  is  stvrrt-terin  debt,  including  interest arrears  on  long-term
debt.  In several of the most severely indebted low-income African countries,- 16  -
a large  share  of this  debt  is in  arrears.
This debt structure contrasts sharply with  that of  the  highly
indebted  middle income countries,  whose claims  are highly  concentrated  in
private creditors (three-fifths),  with  less than a  fifth from bilateral
creditors  (direct  and guaranteed)  and the rest from multilateral  creditors
(see  table  6).  The  small  residual  amount  represents  claims  of nonbank  private
creditors.
Table  6:  Summary  of  Debt  Structure
Low-Income  HICs
Africa
Official  direct  bilateral
US$  billion  30  54
percentage  42  12
Creditor  guaranteed/a
US$  billion  6  34
percentage  9  7
Multilateral
US$  billion  26  83
percentage  36  18
Private  (including
short-term  debt)/b
US$  billion  9  357
percentage  13  78
Source: World  Bank  Debtor  Reporting  System.
Notes:  a/Defined  as suppliers  credits  and  fixed-rate  commercial  bank loans.
b/Defined  as private loans not guaranteed.  by debtor governments,
variable  rate commercial  bank loans, short term debt (which may
include  interest  in  arrears  on  public  loans),  bonds,  and
nationalization  obligations.- 17  -
Assessing  The  Magnitude  of the  Debt  Problem
The  low-income countries of  Sub-Saharan  Africa  are  m-:ch less
creditworthy  than had been anticipated  at the time the bulk of the original
nonconcessional  loans  were made.  Their current  debt structure  is, in most
cases, inappropriate  to their current  economic  circumstances  or prospects.
Marginal  adjustments  to past strategies  for dealing  with debt problems  are,
with  few  exceptions,  not sufficient  to resolve  their  debt  distress.
Medium-term  projections  made in 1986-'  show that many of the low-
income  African  countries  will face continuing  debt problems.  Most of the 34
countries  would be unable to finance imports  adequate for adjustment  and
growth,  while at the same time servicing  their  existing  debts.  Additional
borrowing  to fill the  gaps--assuming  creditors  were prepared  to lend--would
push future scheduled  debt service ratios well above levels that these
countries  have been able to meet in the past.  Some  of the  assumptions  about
export  price and volume  growth  made then appear  optimistic  now, reinforcing
the  results  of that  study.
The magnitude  of the effort  that might be required  to extract  low-
income  African countries  from their debt difficulties  can be assessed by
analyzing  the 19 countries  currently  eligible  for the Bank's  Special  Program
of Assistance  (SPA)  for debt distressed  low-income  African  countries.  Real
imports are targeted  to grow at a  rate one percentage  point faster than
population  growth,  starting  from  a 1988 base,  providing  for some  recovery  of
imports  from the  extremely  depressed  levels  of the  mid-1980s. (This  level  of
imports  in 1988-90  corresponds  to that  agreed  to by donors  in setting  targets
3l  World  Bank  1986.- 18  -
for  the  SPA.)  The  target  growth  rate  of real imports  translates  into  an eight
percent  nominal  growth  rate.  (See  appendix  table  3.)  With projected  export
growth  of eight percent in nominal terms,  which is a  turnaround  from the
declines  in  export  volumes  over  the  last  20 years,  the  implied  current  account
deficit  (before  receipt  of  grants)  would  be $8.8  billion  in 1989.
In the first exercise, the nonconcessional  equivalent  of the  19
countries'  total  external  debt  was  held constant,  relative  to exports  through
1995.  This target  would represent  a minimum  requirement:  creditworthiness
should  not deteriorate.41  The  change  in the level  of nonconcessional  debt  is
the  sustainable  current  account  deficit  in each  year after  grants  and  payment
of interest.  The difference  between this current account deficit and net
exports  of goods and all services  is the necessary  level of grants.  The
results  of this  exercise  indicate  that  the  grant  equivalent  of any  combination
of  loans  and  grants must  be  68  percent to  keep  the  ratio  of  the
nonconcessional  equivalent  of debt to exports constant.  At one extreme,
commercial-rate  loans can be combined  with pure grants.  The other extreme
would be financing  entirely  by concessional  loans  with a 68 percent  grant
element.5-
To represent  a move toward  potential  creditworthiness,  the target
ratio  of the  nonconcessional  equivalent  of debt  to exports  was lowered  to 200
percent  in 1995, compared  with its present level of 330 percent.  Casual
empirical  work indicates  that  a debt  to  export  ratio  of 200  percent  is  a rough
divider  between  countries  that  have  maintained  creditworthiness  and those  that
The  nonconcessional  equivalent  of debt  was  calculated  as the  present
discounted  value  of scheduled  debt  service  payments  on disbursed  debt,  using  a
discount  rate  of nine  percent. An average  nine  percent  rate  of interest  was
also  assumed  on the  nonconcessional  equivalent  debt  over  the  projection
gpriod.
_  Grants  can  include  the  grant  equivalent  of  debt forgiveness.- 19  -
experienced  debt servicing  difficulties. This ratio  would be an upper  bound
to creditworthiness  in low-income  Africa,  given the lower short-term  growth
potential  of the  region.
Achieving  this target  path of debt would require  reducing  debt by
almost  $12  billion  dollars  as measured  in  terms  of its  net  present  value. The
grant equivalent  of the debt relief  required  annually  between  now and 1995
would  raise  the  overall  grant  equivalent  of all  combined  grant  and  loan  flows
to these  19  countries  to  over  90 percent.
These  results  indicate  the  extent  of medium  term support  that these
low-income  debtor  countries  need in aggregate. A case-by-case  study,  taking
into  account  the  conditions  of individual  debtor  countries  would  be required
to  make  a more  definitive  calculation  for  specific  countries.- 20 -
Responses  to  Date
The low-income  countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  have benefitted  from
both  regular  and  special  measures  to  help  alleviate  their  debt  problem. These
include  reschedulinigs,  cancellations of  concessional debt,  increased
concessional  inflows,  and  concessional  debt  relief. Because  of some  of these
measures,  debt  service  payments  have,  in  aggregate,  been  less  than  their  level
of debt,  even  adjusted  for  its  higher  concessionality,  would  have suggested.
Reschedulings.  During 1980-88,  21 of  the 25 Sub-Saharan  countries tLhat
rescheduled their debts with  official and  private creditors were  low-
income.  These  countries  had  88 agreements  within  the  multilateral  frameworks
of the Paris  and London  Clubs,  about  85 percent  of the total.  About three-
fourths  of these  agreements  were with the Paris  Club,  and, in total,  during
the  eight  years  1980-87,  these  Paris  Club  reschedulings  reduced  scheduled  debt
service  payments  by $10 billion,6-  which is equivalent  to 57 percent  of the
total debt  service payments.  The  annual  consolidation  of  debt service
obligations  has been  increasing,  from  an average  of $0.6  billion  in 1980-81  to
a peak  of $1.8  billion  in 1986.
Nor is the official  debt of other  creditors  fully  serviced. Paris
Club  agreements  oblige  debtor  governments  to seek  parallel  treatment  from its
creditors  that do not participate  in the Paris Club, especially  Arab and
Eastern  bloc countries.  Although  details of such arrangements  are seldom
reported,  it would appear that only about one-third  of the obligations  on
Soviet debt and only about --------  of those on Arab debt are being
This  amount  is  a gross  reduction;  it  does  not  take into  account  the
moratorium  interest  payments  on the  consolidated  debt  service.- 21 -
regularly  paid.
In June 1987,  the  economic  summit  in  Venice  agreed  that  "for those  of
the poorest  countries  that are undertaking  adjustment  efforts,  consideration
should  be given  to the  possibility  of applying  lower  interest  rates  on their
existing  debt,  and agreement  should  be reached,  especially  in the Paris  Club,
on longer  repayment  and grace periods  to ease the  debt burden."  After that
date,  several reschedulings  by  the  Paris Club  have  reflected the  new
approach. Mozambique,  Somalia,  Guinea-Bissau,  Niger,  and  Malawi  all received
20-year maturities, including 10  years'  grace,  compared with  15-year
maturities  with six years'  grace for the five other low-income  Sub-Saharan
African  countries  that  rescheduled  over  the  same  period.
Debt Cancellation.  In 1978, the UNCTAD adopted a resolution  calling on
official creditors to  cancel concessional  debt  owed to  least developed
countries  (27  of the  34 low-income  African  countries  are  currently  classified
by the UN as least  developed). During  1978-87,  14 OECD countries  that are
members of the Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC) cancelled  over $1.4
billion  of concessional  debt, about a fifth  of their concessional  loans to
IDA-eligible  countries  in the region.71  Much of the zrvice on this debt
would  probably  have  been  rescheduled  by the  Paris  Club (ibout  $1.2  billion  in
debt service  owed on concessional  debt was rescheduled  in 1980-87,  or about
$150 million  per year).  Thus, the additional  savings  in any year from the
cancellations  would amount to only the moratorium  interest  chargLs on the
consolidated  amounts, or some $5 million per year on average.  But the
additional savings from cancellation  would  increase over  time,  because
cancellations  would reduce the growth in the stock of consolidated  debt
Li These  creditors  report  higher  cancellations--about  $2  billion  for 1978-
87/88,  which  is two-thirds  of their  cancellations  worldwide.  (UNCTAD  1988).- 22  -
service  from rescheduling,  which progressively  increases  moratorium  interest
charges.8/
Increased  Official Aid Flows.  In addition to their efforts to
alleviate  debt  burdens  directly,  creditor  governments  and  agencies  have  sought
to increase  the  net flow  of new funds.  Multilateral  agencies  (including  the
IMF) have increased  their  net ODA disbursements  to Sub-Saharan  Africa even
faster  than bilateral  donors have.  When deflated  by the region's  import
prices,  net  ODA  disbursements  (including  grants)  by  multilateral  agencies  grew
by 12 percent  a year between  1983  and 1985 and by 13 percent  a year in 1986
and  1987.  IDA  accounts for  most  of  this  increase; since  1983, net
disbursements  from  IDA  have  grown  25 percent  a  year in  real  terms,  three  and  a
half times the annual  rate for other  multilateral  agencies.  Bilateral  ODA
rose by 12 percent  a year in 1986 and 1987,  as measured  by the volume of
imports  the  aid could  finance,  despite  the  shrinking  global  volume  of aid  and
the  decline  of food  aid  and emergency  relief  for  the Sub-Saharan  Africa  since
1985.
The World  Bank's Special  Program  of Assistance. At a donors  conference  in
December 1987, the World Bank formally launched the Special Program of
Assistance  for low-income,  debt-distressed  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
The  objective of  the  three-year (1988-90) program is  to help  eligible
countries  adjust and grow, while restoring and sustaining  normal debtor-
creditor  relationships.  The program provides  for substantially  increased
highly  concessional,  quick-disbursing  financing,  and debt relief  on softer
8/  To illustrate,  $150  million  rescheduled  annually  at 3 percent  interest
would,  after  8 years,  give  rise  to  additional  interest  obligations  of $180
million  per  year.-23  -
terms  to  expand  import  capacities  in  eligible  countries.
Donors  have  agreed  on three  eligibility  criteria  for  the  SPA:  first,
poverty (eligibility  for IDA credits but  not  IBRD loans); second, debt
problems  (originally  a projected  debt service  ratio  of 30 percent  or more in
1988-90); and  third, adjustment (currently implementing  a  policy reform
program supported by  the Bank and  IMF, including  agreement on a  Policy
Framework  Paper). Nineteen  countries  are  currently  eligible  and  others  may be
approved  soon.9/
The  program  established  a framework  of five  elements  for  case-by-case
assistance to  eligible countries.  This  framework includes increased
adjustment  lending  from  IDA-8,  increased  cofinancing  and  coordinated  financing
from bilateral  and other  multilateral  donors  for adjustment  operations,  and
supplemental  IDA adjustment  credits.  These resources  would  be provided  in
conjunction  with additional  IMF resources  from the ESAF and greater debt
relief.  These five components  constitute  the pool of additional  assistance
being made available to eligible  debt-distressed  countries  under the SPA,
although  the  total  resources  available  for  some  components  are  not  necessarily
restricted  to African low-income,  debt-distressed  countries  or limited to
1988-90.10/
9/  These  eligible  countries  are:  Burundi,  Central  African  Republic,  The
Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mali,
Mauritania,  Mozambique,  Niger,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Senegal,  Tanzania,  Togo,
Uganda  and  Zaire. In  April  1989,  Chad  became  eligible  and Benin  and  Somalia
are  expected  to be  accepted  as eligible  soon.
__/  Some  donors  have  discussed  the  possibility  of including  within  the
framework,  proposals  to  deal  with  commercial  debt  not  eligible  for  Paris  Club
rescheduling.  This  private  debt is  about  3 percent  of total  external  debt  and
7  percent  of debt  service  payments  of the  19 countries  currently  eligible  for
the  SPA. An objective  of any  proposal  to reduce  this  private  debt  would  be to
transfer  to debtor  countries  the  prevailing  market  discounts  on it  (which  are
75  percent  or more). This  could  be accomplished  through  a variety  of
mechanisms,  including  direct  cash  buybacks,  debt for  debt  swaps,  conversion  of
debt  to  equity,  exit  bonds,  or  direct  contributions  by creditor  institutions.- 24 -
Additional  IDA-8  adjustment  lending.  About half of the eighth  IDA
replenishment  has been set aside  for Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Two-thirds  of this
predominately quick  disbursing money  is  earmarked to  debt-distressed
countries.  This high allocation  reflects  the addition  of $1 billion  above
regular project and  program *ending as  IDA's contribution  to  the  SPA.
Additional  disbursements  from IDA's SPA contribution  to the 19 currently
eligible  countries  are projected  at $0.7 billion in 1988-90.  Overall,  the
program  should  enable  IDA to increase  its disbursements  to the low-income,
debt distressed  countries  of the region  by about 50 percent,  compared  with
levels  during  the  previous  three  years.
Increased cofinancing  of  adjustment operations.  Eighteen donor
governments  and multilateral  agencies pledged an initial $6.4 billion in
concessional,  quick-disbursing  funds for low-income  African countries  with
debt problems. These funds  will be provided  through  both  formal  cofinancing
of  specific  IDA-supported adjustment  operations and  other  financing
coordinated  closely  with these  same operations. About  half was  estimated  to
be additional  to  aid disbursements  already planned by  donors for  these
countries.  By  early  1989, donors had  given  indications  of  specific
commitments  of over $5 billion,  of which  about  $1 billion  had been  disbursed
by the  end  of 1988.  If a high rate  of disbursements  (about  80 percent  over  3
years)  can be achieved,  these  commitments  could  be expeced to  disburse  some
$4 billion during 1988-90.  Additional  commitments  of  the pledges would
further  increase  disbursements.
Supplemental  IDA adjustment credits.  A  special allocation  for
supplemental  IDA adjustment  credits  for IDA-only  countries  with outstanding
IBRD debt (other  than for  enclave  projects)  was added in September  1988 to
support the SPA.  The global allocation  would average 10 percent  of IDA- 25 -
reflows  and investment  income  on IDA dono. encashments  in fiscal 1989-¶l3p
divided among qualifying  countries in proportion to their IBRD interest
payments. Supplemental  IDA adjustment  credits  totaling  $87 million  will be
provided  in 1989  for  eight  countries  (which  is  equivalent  to  about  _  percent
of their  annual  IBRD interest  obligations). In support  of this initiative,
the  governments  of  Norway  and  Sweden  also  made  grant  funding  available  to  help
meet  IBRD  debt  service  in four  African  countries  in 1989.
ESAF.  At the  end  of 1987>  the  International  Monetary  Fund set  up an
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF),  to help low-income  countries
with protracted  external  payments  problems  undertake  policy  adjustment  growth
over the medium term.  This program supplements  the original  Structural
Adjustment  Facility  (SAF),  which was established  in March 1986. Together,
these  two programs  can provide  $11.7  billion  (31  percent  from  the  SAF  and 69
percent from the ESAF) in  10-year  credit, including  5 year's grace, at
interest  rates  of 0.5 percent,  to low-income  countries,  mostly  in Africa.ll/
By the  end  of 1988,  SAF  arrangements  totaling  $1.3  billion  had  been  agreed  for
22 Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  with  disbursements  of $0.6  billion. In  July
1988,  Malawi  became  the  first  country  to receive  assistance  from  the  ESAF,  and
programs  for  four  more  African  countries  had  been  approved  by the  end  of 1988
with commitments  totalling  $0.9  billion  and disbursements  $0.2  billion. ESAF
arrangements  approved  so far  provide  an average  access  of  about  165  percent  of
quota,  much  higher  than  the  70  percent  now  available  under  the  SAF.
More  concessional  debt  relief.  The  SPA  calls  for  continued
rescheduling  on conventional  terms  to provide  cash-flow  relief  during 1988-
11/ SDRs  have been converted  to US$  at US$1.35  per SDR,  the  exchange  rate  at
end  of March  1986.- 26 -
90.  Such rescheduling  has  occurred or  is expected for  15 of  the  19
countries. But the SPA  also calls  for  more concessional  debt relief  in two
forms:  (1)  further  conversion  of  bilateral  ODA loans  to  grants,  and (2)  softer
terms  on  rescheduled commercial loans  from  or  guaxinteed by  creditor
governments.  Much  has  been  accomplished  on both  fronts.
More  ODA Conversions.  In 1987-88  Canada  and  Germany  moved  to convert
their  ODA loans  to grants.  After  the  Toronto  Summit,  Japan  added  eight  low-
income  countries  to its program  of financing  debt service  on its ODA loans
with additional  grants,  bringing  the total  to 14 in  Africa. France  recently
announced  a conversion  of ODA loans to grants for a long list of African
countries. And the United  States  is also considering  allowing  repayment  in
local  currencies  for  certain  types  of concessional  debt,  although  this might
be financed  by transfers  out of the aid budget.  But the actual  short-term
cash savings  of these cancellations,  as explained  above,  would  probably  be
small--on  the order of $1-2 million a  year in addition to conventional
rescheduling.
The Concessional  Debt  Relief  Menu.  The  Toronto  agreement,  finalized
in Berlin at  the 1988 Annual Meetings of  the World Bank and  the IMF,
represents  a major  breakthrough  by creditor  governments  to reduce  the burden
of  their  official nonconcessional  debt  in  low-income, debt-distressed
countries,  mostly  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  It is a way to lower  debt service
payments  in  the  shortterm  with  less  build  up of  nonconcessional  debt  that  must
be serviced  in the long term.  And it established  the principle  of reducing
the  stock  of official  nonconcessional  bilateral  debt.1 2/- 27 -
Creditors  agreed on a menu of comparable  options to increase  the
concessionality  of rescheduling  official  nonconcessional  debt.  These  options
are:
A. Partial writeoff.  Forgiveness  of  one-third  of eligible  debt
service  due  during  the  consolidation  period,  and  rescheduling  of the  remainder
at  market  interest  rates  with  a 14-year  maturity.
B. Longer  terms.  Rescheduling  of eligible  debt service  due during
the  consolidation  period at  market interest rates, but  with a  25-year
maturity.  And
C.  Lower  interest  rates. Rescheduling  of  debt interest  rates  (either
3.5 percentage  points  below  or one-half  of market  rates,  whichever  gives  the
smallest  reduction),  with  a 14  year  maturity,  including  8 years  of grace.
Creditor  governments  have described  the three  options  as comparable
in the sense  that partial  writeoff  and lower  interest  rates  offer  a similar
concessionality,  while  longer  terms,  though  less  concessional  involves  greater
risk  as creditors  choosing  this  option  would  not  begin  to be paid  until  after
those  choosing  the  other  options  were  repaid.
By the end of 1988,  this menu of options  had been applied  by the
Paris  Club to five Sub-Saharan  countries  (Mali,  Niger,  Tanzania,  Madagascar,
L2/  On ODA  debt,  the  Toronto-Berlin  consensus  provides  for  25-year  maturities
at interest  rate-  no higher  than  those  originally  contracted.  Additional
concessionality  would  result  only  if the  rescheduling  increases  grace  and/or
maturities.- 28 -
and Central  Africa Republic)  and was subsequently  been applied to Guinea,
Senegal,  Guinea,  and Uganda  in early  1989.  In applying  the  various  options,
two creditors  have chosen  to forgive  a third  of the  debt-service  obligations
on loans  covered  by the  rescheduling  arrangements  (option  A); four creditors
have  chosen  to provide  longer  maturities  of 25 years  (option  B);  and  the  other
Paris  Club creditors  have chosen  to reduce  the interest  rates  charged  on the
rescheduled  debt by up to three  and half percentage  points  (option  C).  One
chose a mix of options  depending  in part on the type of loan rescheduled.
Based on the  debt service  on nonconcessional  debt that  the five  debtors  that
rescheduled  in 1988 owe  to the Paris Club creditors in 1989, which the
agreements  cover  wholly  or in  part,  about  half  would  be covered  by option  A, a
seventh  by option  B, and  a third  by option  C.13/
The Toronto-Berlin  consensus  is a helpful step, and it should  be
applied  in future  reschedulings  of these countries.  But it is not a full
solution. First,  debt  owed to regular  Paris  Club creditors  does  not account
for  all  official  bilateral  nonconcessional  debt.  The  debt  owed to Paris  Club
creditors gives rise to  only about a  third of  the  total debt  service
obligations  of the five SPA countries  whose debt was rescheduled  under the
menu approach  in 1988.  Second,  the reduction  in debt-service  payments,  over
and  above  that  achieved  by conventional  rescheduling,  is  limited  in the  short-
term to  the  savings on  moratorium interest payments.  For  these  five
countries,  the  additional  reduction  in the first  year may  be no more than  $10
13/  Exact  coverage  is  difficult  to  ascertain  in  advance  because  not all  debt
service  owed  to Paris  Club  creditors  is  eligible  for  consolidation  (for
example,  debt  contracted  after  the  cut  off  date  (1983  in five  of the  seven
applications)  is  excluded,  some  previously  rescheduled  debt (one-fifth  of
previous  rescheduling  agreements)  is  excluded,  and  arrears  may  be rescheduled
on less  favorable  terms). It is also  up to the  debtor  to seek  similar  terms
from  other  creditors  that  do formally  not  participate  in the  Paris  Club.- 29  -
million a  year,  although  the  savings in  subsequent years  will  grow
progressively  by that  amount. Third,  some  creditor  governments  are financing
the  debt reduction  provided  for  by the  menu by transferring  funds  from their
aid  budgets to  their  creditor agencies.  This  practice reduces the
additionality  of the  Toronto-Berlin  consensus.
Evaluating  the  Options
The relief to debtor countries that the options agreed on at the Berlin
meeting  would  provide  can be compared  using  two general  criteria:  increasing
net  financial  transfers,  and  contributing  to creditworthiness.
Net Resource  Transfers.  Increased  resources  are needed to enable
debt  distressed countries to  import, invest and  grow.  Conventional
rescheduling  does not increase  net resource  transfers;  it simply  alters  the
profile  over  time  of the  transfers. Rescheduling  actually  reduces  cumulative
net transfers  because  of the additional  financing  changes  when interest  is
consolidated  (although  the  net  present  value  of transfers  is  unchanged). But
concessional  debt relief can increase  transfers by reducing  debt service
payments  over  a specified  period  of time.  But this  increase  will  materialize
only  to the  extent  that  creditors  do  not finance  concessional  rescheduling  out
of existing  aid  budgets,  and that  debtors  would  have  eventually  serviced  their
debt.  Permanent  reduction  in  nominal  debt  service  payments  can  be achieved  by
forgiving  debt,  writing  off debt service  as it comes  due,  or rescheduling  at
reduced  interest  rates.  Extending  terms  reduces  debt service  payments  only  for
a limited  period.- 30  -
Restoring  Debt-Servicing  Capacity.  Restoring  normal  debt-servicing
capacity for these countries will usually require reducing the stock of
nonconcessional  debt (or  the nonconcessional  equivalent  of the stock  of all
debt). Debtors  that  have less  nonconcessional  debt after  rescheduling  should
be better  able to service  both that  debt and any new borrowing. One way to
measure the movement toward debt servicing capacity is  to look at  the
reductiot.  in the  nonconcessional  equivalent  stock  of debt  under  each  option  at
the end of a  specified  period (e.g.,  when the consolidation  period  ends).
Nonconcessional  debt  can be reduced  by borrowers  repaying  it as scheduled,  by
rescheduling  it at below-market  interest  rates,  or by creditors  writing it
off.  Rescheduling  on conventional  terms  alone  does not reduce  the stock  of
debt  and  consolidation  of interest  obligations  actually  increases  it.
These  criteria  are used  here to compare  the three  options  now  being
applied  by the Paris  Club with two other options  chosen  as benchmarks  for
comparison:
No rescheduling.  This option  assumes  that  debtor  countries  are able
to pay  all  of their  debt service  obligations  on time,  which  they  are  unlikely
to be able to do without  a substantial  increase  in financial  resources  or a
severe compression  of growth.  This option,  however,  provides  a point of
reference  for  assessing  the  benefits  of the  various  rescheduling  options.
Conventional rescheduling.  This  option represents the  average
rescheduling  terms that the Paris Club has given the ten low-income  debt
distressed  countries that rescheduled  during 1987-88 before the menu of
options began to be applied.  These consist  of rescheduling  virtually  all
nonconcessional  debt  service at  market rates with  an  18-year maturity,- 31 -
including  8 years grace.  No country  received  exactly  those  terms (half  got
better terms, half worse) but they serve as a  benchmark  for the current
practice,  against which the more concessional  rescheduling  options  can be
assessed.
The following  analysis  compares  the  benefits  of these  options  for  22
low-income  debt distressed countries currently eligible for the  Special
Program  of Assistance.  It is based on the results  using the World Bank's
rescheduling  model and debt data compiled  for the Wot;d Debt Tables, and
focuses  only on nonconcessional  debt owed by these  ccuntries  to Paris  Club
creditors (including  pari passu  debt).  Although the specific  empirical
results  depend on the debt structure  of the countries  analyzed  and on the
various assumptions  about :he implementation  of  the options,  the results
nonetheless  indicate  the relative  merits of the various proposals.  The
accompanying  box  defines  and  explains  the  indicators  shown  in  table  7.
Box:  Interpreting  the  data
Table  7  shows comparative  indicators for  the  five rescheduling
scenarios  studied. Table  8 shows  annual  debt  service  obligations  during  1988-
2025  and the  remaining  stock  of debt  at the  end  of  each  year  for  each  the  five
options. Graphs  1 and  2 compare  the streams  of debt-service  payments  and  the
stocks  of remaining  nonconcessional  debt  after  rescheduling  under  each  option.
The net present  value (NPV)  of total  debt service  payments  during
1988-2025  (columns  1 and 2 of Table 7) is based on all payments  during  the
life  of the  loan,  account  taken  of any  rescheduling.141
14'For  these  columns,  the  period  covered  is 1988-2025,  whereas  the  rest  of the
table  refers  to the  cumulative  consolidation  period,  1988-2000.- 32 -
The  relative grant  element of  each  option  (column 3)  is  the
proportion  by which  the  NPV of debt service  payments  without  rescheduling  is
reduced by each option.  It measures the concessionality  provided  by the
option  (higher  values  denote  options  that are more concessional)  and can be
used  to rank  the  options  in  terms  of overall  concessionality.15/
The  nonconcessional  equivalent  debt  stock  at  year-end  2000  (columns  4
and 5) shows  the  present  discounted  value,  as of the  year  2000,  of all  future
principal  and interest  payments outstanding  at the end of the cumulative
consolidation  period.  Nonconcessional  equivalent  debt increases  because  of
the  rescheduling  of interest  obligations  at market  rates  during  1988-2000  and
decreases  as a result  both of actually  paying  principal  after  the  end of the
grace period and  of  applying concessional  moratorium interest rates on
rescheduled  amortization  obligations. Longer  terms  result  in higher  debt at
the end of the consolidation  period,  because  principal  payments  are delayed
longer  and  are  smaller  each  year.
Information  on debt  service  obligations  during  1988-2000  (columns  6-
11)  covers  principal  and interest  on both  original  debt  and  new  debt  resulting
from consolidating  interest  obligations. Total  debt service  obligations  are
shown  in both  nominal  dollars  and in terms  of their  net  present  value.  (The
NPV figures  in column  11 are smaller  than  the sum  of columns  1  and 2 because
the  former  do not include  payments  during  2001-25.)
16/  The NPV of debt service  payments  without  rescheduling  is slightly  less
than  the  actual  stock  of debt  at the  end  of 1987  because  the  standard  discount
rate is higher than the current  market interest  rate used here (10 and 9
percent,  respectively).  Thus, these "relative  grant  elements"  understate  the
total  concessionalityz(as  conventionally  defined)  of each  option  to the  extent
that  standard  terms  before  rescheduling  already  provided  some
concessionality.  But  the  ranking  of options  is unaffected.- 33 -
The  amount  of debt service  rescheduled  (columns  12 and 13)  is simply
the sum of annual consolidations  of debt service during 1988-2000.  The
amounts  shown  variously  overstate  the actual  contribution  of each option  to
increasing  net financial  flows because they have not been reduced  by the
additional  interest  that accrues  on rescheduled  principal  obligations  and on
consolidated  interest  obligations  (which  is shown  in  column  9) or by principal
payments  on debt service  that  may  have been rescheduled  during  the  first  part
of the  consolidation  period  but  has  come  due  after  the  expiration  of the  grace
period.
Comparative  Results
In terms  of the first  general  criterion  for evaluating  the  options--
the increase  in net financial  transfers  to debtor  countries--the  options  can
be compared  using figures in column 10 of table 7.  Options A  (partial
writeoff)  and C  (lower  interest  rates)  are roughly  comparable  as currently
defined.  Over  the consolidation  period (1988-2000),  total debt service
payments,  if  made  on time,  in  nominal  terms,  would  be only  about  three  fourths
of the  level  that  would  result  with conventional  rescheduling  (second  line  in
table 7).  However,  there  are significant  differences. Option  A results  in
higher  total interest  payments  during 1988-2000  and in higher  annual debt
service  payments  until 1996, when the grace period  ends and the principal
payments  start  coming  due,  which  are larger  under  Option  C.  Option  B (longer
terms)  would result  in somewhat  higher overall  debt service  payments  than
options  A and C, although  still  substantially  less (about  17  percent)  during
1996-2000  than  under-<zonventional  rescheduling.  Option  B  would  also  result  in
lower  annual  debt service  payments  than either  A or C between  the  late 1990s- 34  -
and the  early  2000s,  during  the  period  after  the  end  of the  grace  period  for  A
and  C and  before  the  end  of the  grace  period  for  B.
In terms of increased  concessionality,  which is a measure of the
quality  of the increase  in net financial  transfers,  both  Option  A and C are
substantially  more  concessional than  the  conventional  practice (compare
figures  in column  3 of table  2). with  option  A (partial  writeoff)  being  more
concessional  under  the  specific empirical assumptions  in  this analysis.
Option  B provides  no additional  concessionality,  compared  to recent  Paris  Club
rescheduling  practice  (second  line)  because rescheduling  at market interest
rates  with  no forgiveness  merely  postpones  repayment  while  accruing  additional
charges  at commercial  interest  rates  in  the  interim.
In terms of  the second criterion--the  extent to which different
options reduce the stock of nonconcessional  debt and thereby  help debtor
countries regain creditworthiness--Option  A  and C  again accomplish  more.
Under  Option  A (partial  writeoff)  the  stock  of nonconcessional  debt  at the  end
of the consolidation  period  (the year 2000)  would  be less  than  60 percent  of
the  level  remaining  after  conventional  rescheduling  (compare  figures  in  column
S  of  table  2).  Option  C  (lower  interest rates) would  reduce  the
nonconcessional  equivalent  end-2000  debt  by one quarter. By contrast,  Option
B (longer  terms)  would  actually  increase  the stock  of debt  at the  end of the
consolidation  period  (the  year  2000)  compared  to recent  practice  because  there
would  be  no repayment  of any  of the  debt  until  2001.
The  year-by-year  profiles of  debt  and  debt  service also  are
important.  As table:  8 and graph 2 show,  all of the rescheduling  options
studied,  including  the recent  practice,  have something  in common. All  reduce- 35  -
debt  service  compared  to obligations  without  rescheduling  for  eight  years  (the
length  of the  grace  period  under  conventional  rescheduling  as  well as the  one
assumed  for  options  A and C).  But they  do so at the expense  of higher  debt
service  later  on, lasting  well into  the  next  century. In graph  2 showing  the
profile of  debt service,  each of  the options starts  out below the line
representing  no rescheduling.  The  distance  by  which  they  are below  this  line
shows the amount of debt service  relief,  or the increase  in net financial
transfer.  By 1996,  all of the options  are above the  no-rescheduling  line.
The  distance  above  shows  by how  much  the  rescheduling  increase  debt service  in
the  future.
As graph  2 shows,  Options  A and  C provide  more  debt  service  relief  in
the early  years,  up through  1995.  Option  B and conventional  rescheduling  are
identical during this period.  In  general, debtor governments  probably
consider  debt service  relief  given  up front  to be worth  more than the same
nominal amount of debt service relief later on, because their needs are
immediate  and the  future  is,  in  any  case,  uncertain.
Beginning  in 1996,  graph 2 shows  that debt service  would rise  more
slowly  under Option  B than under  A and C, until early in the  next century.
Option  B would thus provide  a somewhat  longer  period  during  which financial
obligations  would be  less than under conventional  rescheduling--a  longer
period during which debtor countries  would be able to re3tructure  their
economies and attempt to regain creditworthiness. In a  sense,  Option B
postpones  longer  the  problem of  the  future  bulge  in  debt  service
obligations. But the timing  of this  bulge  depends  on the  grace  period  used,
while  its  size  depends  on the  length  of the  actual  repayment  period.
The  year-by-year  profile  of the  stock  of debt is  also important. As- 36  -
graph 1 on nonconcessional  debt shows,  Option  C (lower  interest),  as well  as
repayment as  scheduled  (no  rescheduling), brings  down  the  stock  of
nonconcessional  debt quickest,  although  the  remaining  debt service  due  on the
concessional  debt is substantial.  Option  A is  almost  equivalent  in its  effect
of the  nonconcessional  eqivalent  stock  of debt.  Other  options  (longer  terms
(B), and conventional  rescheduling)  temporarily  increase  the stock  of debt
because  of interest  capitalization. Option B prolongs  the debt burden  the
longest.
To sum  up, the possible  concessional  debt  relief  from the  Paris  Club
will vary  depending on  the  economic circumstances  of  the country, its
particular  debt  profile  and its  mix of  creditors. But  the  options  outlined  at
Toronto  and adopted  by the Paris  Club are clearly  constructive  steps  in the
right  direction. They would  provide  the concessional  debt relief  that these
countries  require  to lower  debt-service  obligations  in the  next few  years  and
to  help  assure  that  they  remain  manageable  in the  near  future.
The  three  proposed  options  have simi 1.ar  concessionality,  when  account
is taken  of the higher  risk faced  by creditors  granting  longer  terms.  But
they  affect  the  debtor's debt  service profile differently and  some
combinations  might serve best the needs of certain  debtors  while different
ones  would  help  others  more.  Partial  forgiveness  (A)  would  provide  the  lowest
and shortest  debt service  profile,  which should  speed  a country's  return  to
creditworthiness. But as currently  proposed,  it would not provide  the  most
financial  relief in the near term.  Longer terms (B) would give financial
relief for a  longer period, but  it would offer no  better relief than
conventional  rescheduling  in the short term and would eventually  require
larger  overall  debt  rervice  payments. Lower  interest  rates  (C),  as defined  in
the proposal,  would give more financial  relief  up front  but at the cost of- 37  -
requiring,  around  the  end  of the  century,  the  highest  debt  service  payments  of
any  option.
The  Problem  of Commercial  Bank  Claims
Holders  of commercial  bank claims  on debt distressed  countries  may
tend to benefit  disproportionately  as the Paris  Club puts into place  these
concessional  rescheduling  proposals.L61  Several of  the debt distressed
countries  have been identified  as countries  in which  a reduction  in the  face
value of claims  (implicit  in the case of a concessional  rescheduling)  would
increase  the likely  future  repayment  stream,  making  both the debtor  country
and the creditors  better  off.  (See Claessens  1988 and Cohen 1989.)  That
benefit would accrue  heavily to the holders of commercial  bank claims if
bilateral official creditors were to provide the entire amount of  debt
forgiveness.
A  debt facility  would  be one  way to reserve  this  gain for  the  debt-
distressed  countries,  instead  of allowing  a gain  to  holders  of commercial  bank
claims  at the  expense  of official  creditors. A debt  facility  is defined  as an
official  entity  that  would  buy all or part of the  commerci4l  bank debt of a
developing  country  and forgive  a portion  of that  debt. A facility  can  operate
directly  on its own  behalf  or indirectly,  loaning  or giving  the  funds  to the
debtor  country.  (See Corden  1988.)  In the latter  case,  the debtor  country
would  negotiate  to repurchase  its  debt,  as Bolivia  has  recently  done. A debt-
distressed  country  facility  would provide  a means  of spreading  the costs  of
debt forgiveness  to commercial  banks,  in  keeping  with the  concept  of equitable
16/  Ironically,  thewcommercial  banks  originating  the  loans  may  not  be the
primary  beneficiaries,  to the  extent  that  they  have sold  their  claims  at a
discount  on the secondary  market.- 38  -
burden  sharing  among  creditors.
Proposed  facilities  have been  criticized  in the  past  for potentially
breaking important  creditor debtor relationships.  For most of the debt
distressed  countries--and  all of those  debt distressed  countries  whose  debt
would be considered eligible for facility purchase--that  relationship  is
likely  to be quite  unimportant  for the foreseeable  future. An exception  is
the  short-term  trade  credit  relationship.  These  claims  (except  for  those  that
have  been  in arrears  for  a long  period  and  are  de facto  long  term  debt)  should
be  excluded  from  consideration  for  purchase  by a facility.
Unlike  a facility  designed  for the purchase  of the debt of highly
indebted  middle  income  countr.es,  a facility  for  the  purchase  of the  long-term
commercial bank  liabilities of  the  debt-distressed  countries would  not
necessarily  face  large  potential  losses  or put  large  amounts  of official  funds
at risk.  An estimated  $3.5  billion  would  be eligible  for  purchase  by a debt
distressed  country  debt facility. At current  market  prices,  that  debt could
be purchased  for less than $350  million.-71 A combination  of a "take it or
leave it offer" plus regulatory  persuasion  may convince  banks to sell at
prices  near  current  levels. If  the  debt  were to be purchased  at open  auction,
the commercial  banks  would,  of course,  reap the benefit  of the  post-purchase
debt  forgiveness. The auction  price  at which they  would  sell  to  the  facility
would  be substantially  above  the  current  market  price. (See  Dooley  1987.)
Other  options  for  sharing  the  burden  of debt  relief  across  commercial
creditors  include  official  tax  and  regulatory  support  for  donations  of claims
to aid agencies  or to charitable  organiz&i.i)ns.  "Debt  for  nature"  and "debt
17/  Prices  are  not  quoted  Zor  the  debts  of many  of the  potentially  eligible
countries. The  above-esticlte  was  based  on the  secondary  market  prices  for
the  debt  of Sudan  and  Zaire,  considering  more  of the  debt  to  be closer  to the
price  of Sudan's  debt.- 39  -
for  development"  swaps  have  already  occurred  on a small  scale. In some  cases
commercial  banks donated  their  claims  to the recipient. The recipient  aid,
charitable,  or environmental  agency  uses  the  local  currency  proceeds  for  local
projects, reducing the  debtor's external transfer.  Currently, the  tax
advantage  for  these  donations  is outweighed,  at least  in the  United  States,  by
the combined  cash and tax proceeds  from secondary  market  sales. (See  Burton
1988).  In other cases, ODA or donated funds have been used to purchase
commercial  bank claims  on the secondary  market. These  purchases  run  the  risk
of raising  secondary  market  prices  and relieving  commercial  banks  from  burden
sharing.  (If the problem commercial  bank debts are a  small part of a
country's  total  debt,  burden  sharing  with  banks  may  not  be a  major  issue.)- 40 -
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Appendix  Table  1
IDA-Only  Countries  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa
External  Debt  at  end-1987
(U.S.  dollars,  billions)
Percent
Share
1  Total  Debt  71.6  100.0
2  Long-Term  59.4  83.0
3  Public  and  Pub.  Guar.  58.2  81.3
4  Official  Creditors  50.8  71.0
5  Multilateral  19.9  27.8
6  Concessional  15.4  21.5
7  Nonconcessional  4.5  6.3
8  Bilateral  30.9  43.1
9  Concessional  17.9  25.1
10  Nonconcessional  12.9  18.1
11  Private  Creditors  7.4  10.3
12  Paris  Club  Eligible  6.0  8.4
13  Commercial  Banks  1.4  2.0
14  Private  Non-Guaranteed  1.2  1.7
15  IMF  5.6  7.8
16  Short-Term  1/  6.6  9.2
Memorandum  Items:
17  Concessional  33.3  46.6
18  Nonconcessional  38.2  53.4
19  Exposure  of Priv.  Creditors  2/
(13+14+16)  9.2  12.8
20  Exposure  of  Offic.  Creditors  2/
(4+12+15)  62.4  87.2
1/ Including  interest  arrears  on long-term  public  debt.
2/  A small  share  of the  short  term  debt  is  likely  to be from  an  official
source  or to carry  an official  guarantee.- 43 -
Appeplix  Table  2
Structure  of  External  Debt  For  NlrOnly  African  Cbuntries  In  1987
($S  Millons)
OFPIC$AL  PRIVATE-SOURC  OFFICIAL  DiF  TOTAL
BILATERAL  DEBT  DB  FltlLAIRAL  DEBT  PURCHASES
PARIS  IDNICt
NON-  CUDB  CUIB  SHORT  NON-
DEEMo  0DUNTY  CDNCESS.  C0NCESS.  ELIG.*/  ELIG.**/  TER M  MCHE  CONCESS.OONCESS.
BENIN,  PEPLES  REUBLIC OF  145  26  360  35  204  . 324  40  . 1,133
URINA FASO  1%  70  35  3  67  . 437  54  . 861
BURUI)  201  3  20  . 37  . 440  55  . 755
CAPE  VERIE  32  13  3  . 11  . 57  16  . 131
CEMNIAL  AFRICAN  REPUBLC  148  87  26  . 28  . 230  29  37  585
CHAD  55  22  42  0  38  . 146  4  10  318
cumoc  n77  1  0  15  . 95  14  . 203
DJIaBrI  71  3  3  . 29  . 75  . 181
EQUAIORIAL  MIMEA  55  68  9  . 11  . 36  7  8  193
EgIUOPIA  1,.06  45  257  140  94  9  811  66  63  2,590
GAMBIA,  THE  70  19  8  9  23  . 148  19  23  319
(1NA,  662  41  192  110  108  . 994  238  778  3,124
SUNEWA  793  258  93  6  138  . 359  108  30  1,784
GUIWE-BISSA1J  99  37  82  . 31  . 154  19  2  424
KENYA  1,328  327  722  56  591  496  835  1,213  381  5,950
IESCTIH  12  5  14  3  4  . 175  29  . 241
LIBERIA  413  79  74  123  175  . 211  252  291  1,613
MADAGASCAR  616  1,366  149  126  119  . 777  80  144  3,377
HALAWI  194  99  24  25  98  . 660  152  110  1,363
HALI  1,119  31  55  5  94  1  624  12  75  2,016
AMURITANIA  929  263  120  7  119  . 375  174  47  2,035
NIGER  251  276  102  129  75  254  446  55  91  1,679
RWANDA  136  0  11  . 39  . 396  2  . 583
SAO  TE  & PRINCIPE  30  18  1  . 4  . 35  0  . 87
SENEGAL  923  836  134  124  319  42  818  232  267  3,695
SIE1R  LEtONE  140  96  84  3  63  . 171  19  83  659
SOMALIA  1,343  187  66  20  92  81  566  25  154  2,534
SMDAN  2,453  2,388  2,022  27  2,019  . 1,216  143  859  11,126
TANZANIA  1,105  1,131  424  1  192  9  1,070  338  65  4,335
TO1O  119  404  39  43  102  . 387  50  78  1,223
UGANDA  153  112  58  . 60  . 662  130  229  1,405
ZAIRE  1,616  3,485  382  496  462  . 1,136  219  833  8,630
ZAMBIA  1,340  1,143  389  221  1,089  . 524  738  957  6,400
TUTAL  17,930  12,939  6,000  1,712  6,550  892  15,390  4,532  5,615  71,557
*/  ESTIMAIED;  PARIS  CLUB  INCLUMES  ALL  SUPPLIERS  CREDITS  &  FIXED  RATE  BAMN  LLANS.
**/  ESrIMATED;  LINDON  CLUB  INCLUDES  ONLY  VARIABLE  RATE  LOW.  TERM  BANK  LDANS  TO  OR  GUARANTEED  BY  THE DEBTOR  COI  NMY,
NOTE: For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  the  set  of  low-incame  African  countries  is  taken  as  those  African  countries
whose  access  to  the  World Bank is  Limited  to  the  World Bank's  soft  loan  facility,  the  International  Development
Association.  External  debt  data  for  Mbzambique,  an  MDA-only  country,  are  not  available.- 44 -
Table 3:  Grant Equivalent  Flows  and  Grant Element  of  Flows  to  Keep Nboncessional  Debt
To EXport Ratio Constant at  End-1987  Level
19  Sub-Saharan  African  Countries  Eligible  for  the  Special  Program of Assistance
(data  in  U.S. dollars,  billions,  unless  otherwise  noted)
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
1 Nxncon. Equiv.  Debt  32.4  34.9  37.7  40.8  44.0  47.5  51.3  55.4  59.9
2 D/E (percent)  330  330  330  330  330  330  330  330  330
3 CA  Deficit  1/  2.6  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.5  3.8  4.1  4.4
4 Exports of  G. and  S.  10.6  11.4  12.4  13.4  14.4  15.6  16.8  18.2
5  Imports  of  G.  ard  S.,  15.8  17.1  18.4  19.9  21.5  23.2  25.1  27.1
Excludig  Interest
6  (5-4)  Norrinterest  Trade  Def.  5.2  5.6  6.1  6.6  7.1  7.6  8.3  8.9
7  Interest  on  debt  2/  2.9  3.1  3.4  3.7  4.0  4.3  4.6  5.0
8  (6+7)  CA  Deficit,  Before  Grants  8.1  8.8  9.5  10.2  11.0  11.9  12.9  13.9
9  (8-3)  Grants  Required  5.5  6.0  6.4  7.0  7.5  8.1  8.8  9.5
10  Grant  Element  of  Loan  ard
Grant  Flows  (percent)  3/  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68
Grants  Required  to  return  D/E  to  200  percent  by  1995
19  Sub-Saharan  African  Countries  Eligible  for  the  Special  Program  of  Assistance
(data  in  U.S.  dollars,  biLlions,  unless  otherwise  noted)
Target  Level  of  Debt  36.3
Debt in  1995 (from  Table 4)  59.9
Present  Discounted  Value  of  Difference:  11.8
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Annual  Supplemental  Grants
Required  to  Achieve  D/E  Targez.
11 1989-1995  1.84  2.01  2.19  2.38  2.60  2.83  3.09
Undiscounted  Total  16.9
12  (11+9)Total  Grants  Required  7.4  8.0  8.6  9.3  10.1  10.9  11.9
13  (2-11)CA  Deficit  After  Grants  1/  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0
Grant  Ele¢ent  of  Loan  and
Grant  Flows  (percent)  91  91  91  91  92  92  92
1/  Deficit  mplied  by  the  target  change  in  debt,  abstracting  from  exchange  rate  changes
among  major  currencies.  This  is  the  current  accoamt  deficit  financed  by  rnoconcessional  borrowing.
The current  account deficit  would  be  larger  if  it  were  financed  by  concessional  loans,  with  a  correspoiding
drop  in  grants.  Hbwever, as  long the  grant  elemnt  (line  10)  remains unchanged, the  time  path of
rnnconcessional  equivalent  debt would  be identical.
2/  Assuming  an  average interest  rate  of  nine  percent  on the  nonr-concessional equivalent
external  debt.
3/  Line  nine  divided  by  the  sum  of  lines  nine  and  three.reitfr  CVcamtrv  t  All bilateral Lrediters linclodine  Pfri-Passu)
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1. t  Pes:hIduliq  b,921  3.419  O  202  1e2  10.610  0  4,807  0  15,497  10.28  .
:.;re-TcrFto  cers:'eduliro:
XF-0es,liro all dcbt aerac.e  at oarket  ratet  3.S06  7,141  13)  3124  12.19  2.100  1,6  8.379  4.2  15.I  1'  7.024  10.61)  4t1.7 win'  8 .eoaru  qraEe  and  IS  mars  aaturaty  3"
'.  Intc  OvtsCe'
A. Partial Fcrqiinems  '
Cnnt'il  canrellaticn  of  13 debt  servite pawonts.  2.m  4.366  31  i  6,962  6.72Z  2.229  5.342  5.436  2,23  11.73.  5,oeB  7.i'C  3S2.1 resuc  ul,no reainana debt srvice at  Vret
rates mth B  vears  rrace  and 14  years eaturatv.
R. Estrded Toers
Penchedulinn  all debt serice  at market  rates  2.034  S.O  (4)  I  I5.6b9  IS,0  O  0  9.716  4,429  13.145  6.111  10.610  4b.87 inth 14 vws orace  nd 2  verS .turltv.
C. Lower  Interest Pates:
Fescnedulifo  all debt  service at 3O basis onints heltc  warket  rates with a  erS  orace period ad  4.077  4.003  22  10.34U2  9,0b6  3,344  2,014  4.9B3  2.496  12,036  5.371  10.610  4.E74 14 We'S  eitultvr. 
tJ
11 lIe  ilwes  presented  here  awe  bated on  data from  the *trid  aus  hbtor Rurtunq System  (M1,  and  a *rld  ant refnchdlivq ael.  1ll remchedulina  atimns are for serial rachedulun over  a cmaative cousolidatian Wtiod  o IS  13rtws  (1989-2000),  I(0 percent cnsowldatium  of orincipal and  interesrt and  nc re-reschedulinq  ifter  1997. The  moratorium  intere-t rate  (9 percent) is  the averace  dDllar dencrinatrd  inteF"t rate mn  rescheduled  lows in 1988. Projections are based  mn  lMarcb  1989  enchacnge  rate  aid wket  interest  rate  aind  asute  no ne  disburnseeta. 21 'he dbttcr cocntries included  in this table atre  thte  22 IPA-eliqible  couutries-esmn. OBtrondi  Chad.  CAR,  The  Gabia. 61ana.  fuirno  G'ineai-iBssau henva,  lSadaqagcv.  Mali. laitn,  Mauritania,  I2atique.  loer.  SaO  TDu  4 Pr'ncire, Se9 al,  Somlia. lanzenis,  logo, Ikanda.  and  Zaire. 3/ kierale Paris Club  terms accorded  to thest countries in 1987-M.
4* Waed  cm  9 cprrent  diacoat rate.
S  '  (enrre of cOncesaIualatv  of eact  oDtion  cEWtred  With  no reschtdulinq.Jrditor  Couatrvz  All bilateral creditors irldudir.  Pari-Patu)  h7t  I sf 2.
ITue  of tet  t  Totil ncmccessnoeal  Pris  Club  eigible  debt  includlrn Prl-Assn.,  2
ebtor  Cruntrv : SP6lioble  cunottres  21
Fable  8. 6vdictions  in debt  service Pavents  and  reminino  debt  stock  under  reschedulins  UDtitmi all  creditors  ealch  otia.  P  .7
I(51  Mtlliars-
.'F  IC%S  1988  199  1990  IWI  1992  1993  1 9  19f5  1299  17  1998  1999  2000  2001  20(2  2Xv3  0N  25  *A  .1
1 Teht  service  tite  3.83  1,979 1,789  1.673  1,534  1.394  1,214  689  503  2`76  14  12.  200  65  71  14  12  1)t  t0
-Pesann'.  dett ntxt. end  v!erid  8,733  7.2W,1  6,0933 4.968  3,938  2,839  I.Bt45  1.122  606  481  37b  91  2512  12  70  bI  53  46  t
2. ReuchedLar,:  all debt  service  at earket  rates
with Bears orace  ald 18  sears  maturity. 37
P*Ceurtion  in dubt  svi.vce  due  cc.ared  to opticon  2  3.708  1.540 1.181  909  62  355  56  136)  199) (1.521)  41,8101  (11946'  12,156) .f 12.2()(,2) '2.214)  12,255)  12.061)  /1.762)
- ,mn:no dett stch.  er  d Oeriod  12.618  13,062  13,7  14  292  14.745  15.090  15.330  15,476  15.36  14,932  14.294  13.473  12,45  13.259 9,(12  ).512  7.043)  5.57  MY.1
3. Tcn. Etimtz  es
A. Fartial Foroi  eness
;mrual  carcelitaton  co.  1,3  debt  service  uay,eots
resctediLino  remani%no  debt  serviice  at market  rates.
- 4:dvcticn  in debt  nvevice  due  c"pared  to ratim  . 3.767  1,686  138  1.164  929  701  442  54  1579) '1.121'  11,4I91 /1.562) (1.677)  1.83I41 (1.6t  1)  (1,343) l1,12b  115  fir.,
- Pettninq eebt stcck.  esd peric-  11.23  11,169  11,183  12,184  11.126 11,.07  10.842i 10.691  10,394  9.812  9.,51  8.06  6.962  5.6e0  4.333  3,326  2.440  1.7!0  1.l 5
Y. E terded  Tesrm.:
kevchedu1inu  all debt  5ernice  at rarket  rates
withe  24 w  crat  rce and  25  Years  satuiuty.
- FEdtwtion  in debt  service  due  coared  to optionl  3,708  1.540  1.181  90  626  355  56  133)  (Bll)  41,077  1,236  (1257)  (1,291)  (1.395) 11.563) (L.67.)  (I1.9b)  2,,U.14  12,#j
- eutairing  dett stock. end  period  12.618 13.062  13.733  14.m2  14.745  25,09M 15,33:i 15.47b  15.562  15.614  15.651  15.679  15.699 15.62?  M331  14,939  14.317  13  129  2.615
C. Liwe' Interest  Rates:
Rescheduling  all debt  sericce  at 35i basis  ooints
naket  ratei  mitt  8  venaTs  orace  and  24  Years  maturity.
- Ooeoj:tnan  in debt ser.ice due  compared  to option  1  3.776  1,71D  1,417  1.206  979  759  506  124  I615) 11,321) 11.727) 12,972)  12.183)  (2,430) (2,221) (1,81)  (1.!41)  (1,225  (t)  °
- Roe-ning  debt stock. end  oeriod  12,618  13.062  13.733 14,M  14,745 15.090  15.339 15.476  15,239  24.478  13.309  12.0D3  10.342  B.34N6 6,465  4,95  3,674  2,542  1,683
I  bich  unconcesional  8,735  7.201  6.i4  4,969  3.889  2.839  1.865  1.122  7C6  481  376  251  202  132  70  61  !¶3  46  40
I;  The  (entres  oresented  here  are  based  on  data  from  the ikrld Bonks  Debtor  Reortino  Snte. (iSI). and  a  iorld  Bank  rescheduling  model. All
reschedulzig  octions are  fcr serial rescheduling  over  a  ceumlatsye  ceomlidatior,  ornied  of 13  vears 19M-2000t. 100  wercont  crsolidatin  of
principal and  interest. and  no  rereschedulmrg  after 1987.  The  nwatoretm  interest  rate 19  oercent)  is the  averoe  dollar donuanated  interest
rate vn  rescheCuled  loans  in 1988.  Projections  are  based  r,n  Phrch  1989  exchange  rates  and  eurket  mnterest  rates  and  ansume  no  new  d*usrsebew  ts.
2  Tke  debtor  caovtfees  included  in this table are  the 22 PA--elioible  coutriets-4enin,  Bururdi,  Ehad,  U0R,  The  tGambi.  Ghana,  Suinei. 6caeea-Disrnd
Venva.  (adagiscrt,  hlt,  )lalans,  Mauritania.  Isaabque Nihger.  Sao  Tome  & Principe.  Senegai  . Soalia. lanrania,  7ogo.  Uganda,  and  laire.
A/  veage Paris  thib terms  accorded  to these  cuntries en  1987-88.Crudittr  Ewtrvin  Al balitat credittl  fis  mcloda.  P.r-P  aus  PM  2 ot  f 2. Ise  im  of  t  kg  Teta  mcracsamrAl  Paris  Lii ulisible  jeib  lisKildIli  Pur'-assi.)
Obtwr  Ca[ntrv  2  XIfelitible  contriin 21
latle  E.  '  edNzt:;s  an  dett servce  waments  od  remaa  debt  stdck  ieler reschelalinp  ctiomu all  creditors  ench  rtion.  11 31
(LII &hilaonn
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2Q13  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  Z24  202;
1. rc fie.ctednar:
- ebt wrvice  due  7  6  4  4  3  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  I  I  I - Rairin rsdebt stock.  end erio  36  31  2  25  23  21  20  20  19  19  12  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2
. nesc  .edAIano  a  l debt  service  at mrtket  rates
iith 9 vwers  race  and  19  wres uturity.  31
- Re"ctim an  debt  service  due  ceared to option I  (1.374) 11.111)  IB721)  562  I467)  O3N7)  193)  1102)  257)  233  (17)  15  10)  /)  (0)  '0)  (0)  10)  t0) - FPesanim  debt  stock.  end  eroiA  3,154  2,20  1,576  1.032  S35  370  210  120  70  40  P  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2
3. Tcttto  I  5- 
-
. artia,)  FOrCaIIes:
A-nual  caecellation  of 113  debt  service  oaveents
rescheWlzinr  resanino  ddtt service  at market  rates.
- F,,:tion  in ddbt  service  due  ccapared  tD optiM  1  500)  2336)  1203)  1114)  263)  136)  119)  26)  10)  20)  20)  (0)  10)  20)  201  (0)  10)  /0)  (01 -ailino  debt  stock.  end  Eiod  I11  419  239  137  79  44  26  20  19  19  12  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2
B. Exterded  Terms:
;evcheuliro all  debt  service  at earket  rates
with 14  vein grace  aoi 25  vears  mtuerity.
- Reductrion  in decbt  service  due  compared  to wtittn  1  MU13\  2154)  IStl 12I40) 2,6  12.01) 112.%) l1.615) 21.260)  11.014)  2793)  2596)  2425)  tI)  /Ik)  '93)  /5)  1.23)  fib)  1') - Renainian  debt  stock,  end  Deriod  1I.560  10,397  9.119  7.789  6.423  5,039  3.021  2.859  2M0M  1.426  927  561  321  1S  *5  4  22  7  2
C. Lcowr  Interest  Rates:
Rescheiling  all debt  service  at 35C  basts  points
eiriet rates  anth  8 rears  qrace  aiWd  14  nwrs saturit.4
- Peduictiwn  in debt  service  due  corDared  to optimn  1  2703)  1475)  (289)  2162)  292l  152)  Q29)  29)  20)  20)  20)  20)  hv;  10)  10)  20)  10)  01)  I01 -Pesairin  debt  stoc  end  pernd  l.C48  613  344  :93  107  56  29  20  19  19  12  4  4  4  3  3  3  2  2 of lhch Pncn:ensitcal  36  31  28  25  23  21  20  20  19  19  12  4  4  4  3  3  2  2
b3ES
1/ The  fqoures  presented  here  are based  on  data  from  tte IVrld 8ash's  Webtor  Reysrting  System  (IC.  and  a tlrld  Pnk reschedalanig  model.  All
rescheduling  eptaoes  are  for serial reschedling  over  a cuulative consolidation  eriod  of 13  Years  11999-200),  100  percent conwlidatien  of
Drincacal  and  interest, and  no  re-reschedulinq  after 1997.  The  stratorium  interest  rate 29  percent)  is the  averwaqe  dollar denominated  interest
rate on  reschedyled  lbcs  in 19O. Projections  are based  w llarch P99  enchanne  rates  and  urtet  interest  rates  aid assune  no  reum  disinrrsewts.
The  dbtctr  countries  included  in this table are the  22  SPA-el3qible  countries-Ehsin.  Erutndi.  Chad.  CAR,  The anbia,.  Diana,  6uinea.  Ouinea-kiwad
)enya.  Sadqascar.  Mfla.  Malawi.  t4untanua.  Mozadique,  almer.  Sao  loe  A Principe.  Sneqal.  Smlia.  Tanzania,  Togo.  toanda,  ad Zaire.
3'1  Aeraqe  Pans  Club  terts acorded  to these  cAstries  in 199J-E9.48
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